Fregean themes in the TractatusContext, compositionality, and nonsense

  1. Eduardo Pérez-Navarro 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Granada
    info

    Universidad de Granada

    Granada, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04njjy449

Zeitschrift:
Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

ISSN: 0210-1602

Datum der Publikation: 2021

Titel der Ausgabe: The significance of the Tractatus

Ausgabe: 40

Nummer: 2

Seiten: 117-132

Art: Artikel

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Andere Publikationen in: Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

Zusammenfassung

El propósito de este artículo es argumentar a favor de la afirmación de los nuevos wittgensteinianos de que Frege y Wittgenstein comparten una actitud contextualista con respecto a la individuación del contenido y, como resultado, una concepción austera del sinsentido. Para ello, ofrezco interpretaciones alternativas de los pasajes del Tractatus en los que Wittgenstein parece comprometerse con la actitud opuesta al contextualismo: el composicionalismo.

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