Creencia, conocimiento y verdadel enfoque lógico-semántico de Frege y Russell y el pragmatista de Peirce y James

  1. Uxía Rivas Monroy
Book:
VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 18-20 July 2012
  1. Concha Martínez Vidal (dir. congr.)
  2. José L. Falguera López (dir. congr.)
  3. José M. Sagüillo (dir. congr.)
  4. Víctor M. Verdejo Aparicio (dir. congr.)
  5. Martín Pereira Fariña (dir. congr.)

Publisher: Servicio de Publicaciones e Intercambio Científico ; Universidad de Santiago de Compostela

ISBN: 978-84-9887-939-1

Year of publication: 2012

Pages: 280-286

Congress: Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España. Congreso (7. 2012. Santiago de Compostela)

Type: Conference paper

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Abstract

This paper describes two different approaches to belief as a cognitive attitude: on one hand Frege and Russell, who highlighted the logical and semantic perspective of belief, and on the other Peirce and James, who understood belief as a rule of action. The paper also intends to emphasize the different philosophical backgrounds of both conceptions of belief, mostly related with their diverse notions of truth and reality.

Data source: Dialnet