The resistanf effect of slursa nonpropositional, presuppositional account

  1. Moreno Zurita, Alba 1
  2. Pérez-Navarro, Eduardo 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Granada
    info

    Universidad de Granada

    Granada, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04njjy449

Revista:
Daimon: revista internacional de filosofía
  1. Pérez Navarro, Eduardo (coord.)
  2. Frápolli Sanz, María José (coord.)

ISSN: 1130-0507,  1989-4651

Año de publicación: 2021

Título del ejemplar: Monográfico sobre «Expressing Hatred: The Political Dimension of Expressives»

Número: 84

Páginas: 31-46

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.6018/DAIMON.481381 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDIGITUM editor

Otras publicaciones en: Daimon: revista internacional de filosofía

Objetivos de desarrollo sostenible

Resumen

El propósito de este artículo es dar cuenta de la resistencia a la cancelación, el rechazo y la retractación exhibida por los slurs. La explicación que ofrecemos es presuposicional. Como las teorías presuposicionales más recientes, además, la nuestra es una propuesta presuposi-cional no proposicional. Nuestra posición es que, para ser exitosas, las proferencias de oraciones que contienen slurs requieren que el common ground incluya ciertos componentes, pero estos componentes no son proposiciones, sino ordena-mientos de mundos.

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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to account for the resistance to cancelation, rejection, and retraction exhibited by slurs. The kind of explanation we offer is a presuppositional one. Like the most recent presuppositional accounts, moreover, ours is a nonpropositional presuppositional proposal. Our view is that, to be felicitous, utterances of sentences featuring slurs require certain components to be part of the common ground, but these components are not propositions, but world-orderings. Keywords: slurs, resistance, cancelation, rejection, retraction, presupposition Resumen: El propósito de este artículo es dar cuenta de la resistencia a la cancelación, el rechazo y la retractación exhibida por los slurs. La explicación que ofrecemos es presuposicional. Como las teorías presuposicionales más recientes, además, la nuestra es una propuesta presuposi-cional no proposicional. Nuestra posición es que, para ser exitosas, las proferencias de oraciones que contienen slurs requieren que el common ground incluya ciertos componentes, pero estos componentes no son proposiciones, sino ordena-mientos de mundos. Palabras clave: slurs, resistencia, cancelación, rechazo, retractación, presuposición Recibido: 28/05/2021. Aceptado: 01/07/2021. * This paper has been funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation under the research project “Dis-agreement in Attitudes: Normativity, Affective Polarization and Disagreement” (PID2019-109764RB-I00), by the Regional Government of Andalusia under the research projects “Public Disagreements, Affective Polariza-tion and Immigration in Andalusia” (B-HUM-459-UGR18) and “The Inferential Identification of Propositions: A Reconsideration of Classical Dichotomies in Metaphysics, Semantics and Pragmatics” (P18-FR-2907), and by the University of Granada under a “Contrato Puente” fellowship and the excellence unit FiloLab-UGR (UCE. PPP2017.04). The authors would also like to thank Alex Davies, María José Frápolli, Claudia Picazo, Andrés Soria, and two anonymous reviewers for Daimon for their helpful comments and suggestions. ** PhD candidate at the Department of Philosophy I, University of Granada. E-mail: almorenozurita@gmail.

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