El textualismo

  1. Rodríguez-Toubes Muñiz, Joaquín 1
  1. 1 Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
    info

    Universidade de Santiago de Compostela

    Santiago de Compostela, España

    ROR https://ror.org/030eybx10

Revista:
Cuadernos electrónicos de filosofía del derecho

ISSN: 1138-9877

Ano de publicación: 2021

Título do exemplar: Junio (2021)

Número: 44

Tipo: Artigo

DOI: 10.7203/CEFD.44.19402 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR

Outras publicacións en: Cuadernos electrónicos de filosofía del derecho

Obxectivos de Desenvolvemento Sustentable

Resumo

Textualism is a prescriptive theory of legal interpretation that advocates a specific methodology for saying the law in legislated matters. It claims that the interpreter must declare the public meaning of the legal text, deferring in any case to what the text conveys, except in case of error or mistake. The article outlines the emergence of textualism in the United States of America and its contrast with the doctrines it challenges, particularly instrumentalism, intentionalism and finalism. The article also deals with the association of textualism and originalism, and it examines the crucial challenge of textualism, namely to develop a semantic thesis that plausibly links the meaning of the text with the one that is conveyed by the legislator and has its authority. Ultimately, textualism is justified if and only if the legislator is a legitimate authority.

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Información de financiamento

Este trabajo forma parte del proyecto de investigaci?n PID2019-105841RB-C22, financiado por el Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovaci?n.

Financiadores

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Fonte de datos: Dialnet