El significado de «derecho» y el concepto de derecho

  1. Joaquín Rodríguez-Toubes-Muñiz
Revista:
Persona y derecho: Revista de fundamentación de las Instituciones Jurídicas y de Derechos Humanos

ISSN: 0211-4526

Ano de publicación: 2020

Título do exemplar: Cuarenta años de la publicación de Natural Law and Natural Rights de John Finnis [II] (José Antonio Retamar, coord.)

Número: 83

Páxinas: 359-396

Tipo: Artigo

DOI: 10.15581/011.83.002 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso aberto editor

Outras publicacións en: Persona y derecho: Revista de fundamentación de las Instituciones Jurídicas y de Derechos Humanos

Obxectivos de Desenvolvemento Sustentable

Resumo

John Finnis advocates in Natural Law and Natural Rights a conceptual and practical investigation of law that identifies its central case and rejects attempts to formulate a concept common to competing descriptive legal theories. This study questions this methodological approach and argues that forming a neutral concept of law is a sensible and important theoretical objective; and that the common meaning of the word «law» is a viable starting point for achieving it. The central case method is inappropriate for a descriptive legal theory because it applies an interpretation of that centrality that arises from a particular conception of law; and it excludes that law could have the negative value described bycompeting conceptions. The central case method would be apt if law is a specific phenomenon described and named in the past which is now the precise reference of «law». However, the prevalence of theoretical disagreements makes this hypothesis implausible and suggests that law is what human groups have historically recognised as such, as reflected in the use of the word «law» and its equivalents.

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Fonte de datos: Dialnet