Development and validation of the Monopoly on Truth ScaleA measure of political extremism

  1. Marcos Dono 1
  2. Mónica Alzate 1
  3. Gloria Seoane 1
  4. José Manuel Sabucedo 1
  1. 1 Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
    info

    Universidade de Santiago de Compostela

    Santiago de Compostela, España

    ROR https://ror.org/030eybx10

Revista:
Psicothema

ISSN: 0214-9915

Ano de publicación: 2018

Volume: 30

Número: 3

Páxinas: 330-336

Tipo: Artigo

DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso aberto editor

Outras publicacións en: Psicothema

Resumo

Background: Extreme political attitudes have been on the rise since the economic and political crisis of 2008. This surge of extremism constitutes a real threat, as attitudes like these are dangerous for the peaceful, democratic functioning of society. A new cognitive style, Monopoly on Truth has been proposed, based mainly on the concept of naïve realism. Method: The development and validation of a scale for this new construct is the main objective of this study. A pilot study (N=209) was performed in order to gather the items that make up the fi nal scale; and a main study (N=369) was conducted to test the validity and predictive power of the scale. Results: The validation is successful as the scale shows good reliability scores, while also proving to be linked to extremism-related constructs. Additionally, the scale shows signs of not being ideologically biased. Conclusion: Results show the scale to be a very useful tool for studying extremism and other political trends. Future directions and other implications of the Monopoly on Truth are also discussed

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Información de financiamento

This research is partly funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and the European Social Fund (2016 grant for predoctoral contracts BDNS:316231 and Grants for Excellence Projects 2015. PSI2015-66608-P). Research is also partly funded by the Consellería de Cultura, Educación e Ordenación Universitaria, Xunta de Galicia (ED431B 2016/017).

Financiadores

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