Diferencias individuales en razonamiento hipotético-deductivoimportancia de la flexibilidad y de las habilidades cognitivas

  1. Seoane Pesqueira, Gloria
  2. Valiña García, María Dolores
  3. Rodríguez González, María Soledad
  4. Martín Rajo, Montserrat
  5. Ferraces Otero, María José
Revista:
Psicothema

ISSN: 0214-9915

Ano de publicación: 2007

Volume: 19

Número: 2

Páxinas: 206-211

Tipo: Artigo

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Outras publicacións en: Psicothema

Resumo

Investigaciones recientes señalan que la ejecución diferencial de las personas cuando resuelven tareas de razonamiento se debe no sólo a diferencias a nivel computacional, sino también a nivel racional o intencional. Este trabajo se enmarca en este contexto y en él, concretamente, se analizan diferencias individuales en razonamiento hipotético-deductivo teniendo en cuenta, además de características asociadas a la propia tarea (contenido e instrucciones), características diferenciales de los propios sujetos. Participaron 276 estudiantes de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela a los que se les aplicaron diferentes pruebas psicométricas y que resolvieron distintas tareas de razonamiento. Los resultados que hemos obtenido confirman que, efectivamente, las diferencias entre razonadores competentes y no competentes se dan en los dos niveles señalados: habilidades y capacidades cognitivas (nivel algorítmico) y flexibilidad cognitiva (nivel intencional).

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Fonte de datos: Dialnet