El derecho como ciencia: una aproximación desde la epistemología sobre el carácter de cientificidad del derecho y su praxis

Resumo

This work focuses in the analysis of the epistemic statute of law and in a critic of its presumption of scientificity. From the Greco-Roman tradition, law is recognized as a kind of normative knowledge of a contingent and prudential nature, whose cognitive function is closely linked to technical application, to become in a social of enormous sophistication, that although it keeps similar elements to the episteme, its practical prescriptive function grants to it a rationality of its own, different from scientific rationality. Along these lines, a historical account of legal thought is made around the idea of the scientificity of law, seeing different discourses and their justification. The main characteristics of law are compared with those of science, like those of its explanatory function, rationality, demarcation criteria, etcetera, not only to establish the proper distances between this discipline and the sciences, but also to elucidate its epistemic content.